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A Voluntary Cybersecurity Framework Is Unworkable—
Government Must Crack the Whip 
Robert Gyenes* 
INTRODUCTION 
On Black Friday, parents line up at the door of their local department store 
hoping to grab that hot item ticket for their eager kids. Six months later, they apply 
for a car loan and find that their credit has been ruined.1 Why? Because two months 
before Black Friday an employee at an air conditioning and refrigeration firm 
outside of Pittsburgh opened an email he shouldn’t have.2 The email contained 
malware that stole the authentication credentials of the air conditioning and 
refrigeration firm, which was one of Target’s contractors.3 As a direct result of the 
successful breach, 110 million credit card numbers, from some of the nation’s 
largest retailers, were stolen during one of the busiest shopping seasons.4 
Due to the economic loss doctrine, companies face little risk of liability for 
the injuries resulting from their failure to prevent cyber-intrusions.5 Pure economic 
loss by a consumer without any physical injury is difficult to pursue in court.6 This 
immunity from liability from economic loss due to cyber-intrusions provides no 
incentive for corporations to voluntarily take the costly measures necessary to 
prevent such a massive breach.7 Consequently, the response to the Black Friday 
                                                          
* Robert Gyenes is a student at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law and J.D. Candidate, 
Class of 2015. 
1 Chris Isidore, Target: Hacking hit up to 110 million customers, CNN MONEY (Jan. 11, 2014, 
6:20 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/01/10/news/companies/target-hacking/. 
2 Dan Goodin, Epic Target hack reportedly began with malware-based phishing e-mail: Attack 
hit contractor two months before the compromise of 40 million payment cards, ARS TECHNICA 
(Feb. 12, 2014, 4:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/02/epic-target-hack-reportedly-began-
with-malware-based-phishing-e-mail/. 
3 Id. 
4 Isidore, supra note 1. 
5 Nathan Alexander Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1503, 1557 (2013). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 1555–57. 
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breach was not massive private investment in prevention.8 Instead, affected stores 
merely offered a year of free credit monitoring.9 
For all the benefits and profit brought by the increasingly connected world, 
connectivity has unleashed countless troubles. Cybercrime has increased 
fantastically since the internet’s humble beginning.10 Cybercrime has become a 
bigger threat than terrorism.11 We have even seen a “worm” scorch the world’s 
computer systems and strand delegates to a cybersecurity summit in Luxembourg 
at the airport when it knocked out the airport’s reservation desk.12 
Governments often speak of protection against cyber threats as a national 
security issue, requiring inventive and comprehensive prevention measures.13 The 
U.S. Government’s approach has been to collaborate with private companies, who 
are significant targets of cyberattacks.14 Recently, the Obama Administration 
proposed a cybersecurity framework for “critical” infrastructure enterprises that 
attempts to satisfy both the demands of these private businesses and the 
overarching goal of better defending our national security’s vulnerability to 
cyberattack.15 
This private-public partnership has cooled significantly due in large part to 
the NSA PRISM scandal that resulted from Edward Snowden’s release of NSA 
documents on Wiki-leaks.16 It is now harder for lawmakers to address serious 
                                                          
8 Caroline Fairchild, Target security breach likely to be ‘highly sophisticated organized crime,’ 
CNN MONEY (Dec. 19, 2013, 3:43 PM), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2013/12/19/target-security-breach-
likely-to-be-highly-sophisticated-organized-crime/. 
9 Dana Liebelson, Target’s “Second-Rate” Fix for Hacking Victims May Leave Customers 
Vulnerable, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 11, 2014, 3:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/02/ 
target-credit-hack-breach. 
10 Michael Coren, Experts: Cyber-crime bigger threat than cyber-terror, CNN (Jan. 24, 2005, 
1:35 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2005/TECH/internet/01/18/cyber.security/index.html?section=cnn_ 
mostpopular. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 See The White House, The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/cybersecurity/national-initiative (last visited Mar. 6, 
2014). 
14 Mark Rockwell, Agencies pay for public distrust in post-Snowden era, FCW (Jan. 28, 2014, 
12:00 AM), http://fcw.com/articles/2014/01/28/privacy-concerns-agency-costs.aspx. 
15 Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11739, 11739 (Feb. 19, 2013). 
16 Id. 
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cybersecurity threats in a way that is acceptable to powerful industry players.17 As 
a result of this and other concerns, the Obama Administration’s current 
cybersecurity policy is not a viable option for actual advancement in private cyber 
protection. 
One primary problem with the Obama Administration’s cybersecurity plan is 
that it promotes an information-sharing program between the government and 
private industry, which is likely to be ineffective given the reluctance of the private 
sector to participate.18 Additional problems with the President’s policy include 
criticism that the policy may be confusing for private enterprise to implement and 
that executives may struggle with the possibility that voluntary guidelines will 
become mandatory as an industry standard benchmark.19 The policy also creates a 
financial burden on the target “critical” infrastructure without providing a solution. 
20 
A simpler plan could push “critical” industry to improve its cybersecurity 
without these pitfalls. For example, a scheme that focuses on financial support for 
improvement while imposing mandatory liability for security failures would 
produce results yet still allow some independence in how the results are achieved. 
Part I of this Article outlines the characteristics of cyber-attacks that create 
difficulties for policymakers, and argues that any successful government policy 
must take account of the continuously changing tactics of cyber criminals. Part II 
examines the President’s current strategy for improving cybersecurity of “critical” 
infrastructure and discusses the best possible outcome of the Executive Order-
based strategy and subsequent agency implementation. Part III analyzes the 
Executive Order’s “Information Sharing Program” and “Best Practices 
Framework” provisions. Part IV concludes by proposing an alternative plan 
focused on financial support and a mandatory liability regime. 
                                                          
17 Gerry Smith, “Snowden Effect” Threatens US Tech Industry’s Global Ambitions, THE WORLD 
POST (Jan. 28, 2014), http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/%E2%80%9Csnowden-effect%E2%80%9D-
threatens-us-tech-industrys-global-ambitions (last visited Apr. 4, 2014). 
18 Jason Miller, DHS finds classified cyber sharing program slow to take off, FEDERAL NEWS 
RADIO (June 13, 2013, 6:44 AM) http://www.federalnewsradio.com/473/3356694/DHS-finds-classified-
cyber-sharing-program-slow-to-take-off. 
19 James Stenger, Companies Need To Take Notice of the Government’s Cybersecurity Program, 
TMT PERSPECTIVES (Sept. 26, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.tmtperspectives.com/2013/09/26/ 
companies-need-to-take-notice-of-the-governments-cybersecurity-program/. 
20 Anthony M. Freed, ISA Outlines Criteria to Evaluate NIST Cyber Security Framework, 
TRIPWIRE (Feb. 6, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/top-security-stories/isa-
outlines-criteria-evaluate-nist-cyber-security-framework/. 
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I. THE NATURE OF THE THREAT 
On account of the massive scale and variety of targets of modern hackers, 
cybersecurity threats are often treated as a new front in an undeclared war.21 It is 
tempting to force this relatively new threat into the terminology and framework we 
understand by comparing it to a new Cold War or Afghanistan, but there the 
comparisons stop; weapons for this “war” change every day and the “innovation” 
of the enemy is astounding.22 In effect, there are attackers and defenses, but this 
war has no borders, no ideological lines, and no face. 
A. Targets 
Cybercrime targets change each day. Early on, criminal activity in cyberspace 
was aimed at governments and banks, because they were the few that possessed 
large computer networks.23 The targets broadened when a wider range of firms 
collected useable data.24 This meant information brokers, such as credit reporting 
agencies and data aggregators like ChoicePoint or LexisNexis, were ripe targets for 
cyber-crime because of their large stores of identity data.25 But now that computers 
are found in most homes and almost every business, there has been an increase in 
the number and types of potential victims of cybercrimes.26 With news of another 
massive cyber breach every day, one may wonder if such attacks are becoming 
white noise. Schools, department stores, and home computers are all targets.27 Our 
refrigerators are even being hacked.28 Several law firms in Pittsburgh have also 
become victims.29 Headlines and ubiquitous commercials for credit-score 
                                                          
21 Chris C. Demchak, Hacking the Next War, THE AMERICAN INTEREST (Aug. 10, 2012, 12:00 
AM), http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2012/08/10/hacking-the-next-war/. 
22 Id. 
23 Charlotte Decker, Cyber Crime 2.0: An Argument to Update the United States Criminal Code 
to Reflect the Changing Nature of Cyber Crime, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 961 (2008). 
24 Debra Wong Yang & Brian M. Hoffstadt, Countering the Cyber-Crime Threat, 43 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 201, 204 (2006). 
25 Id. 
26 Decker, supra note 23. 
27 Patrick Svitek & Nick Anderson, U-Md. computer security attack exposes 300,000 records, 
THE WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 19, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/college-
park-shady-grove-campuses-affected-by-university-of-maryland-security-breach2014/02/19ce438108-
99bd-11e3-80ac-63a8ba7f7942_story.html. 
28 Silvana Ordonez, Hackers can get into your refrigerator, too, CNBC (Jan. 7, 2014, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/101345760. 
29 U.S. Attorney’s Office, Pittsburgh Man Sentenced for Role in Law Firm Hack, FBI, 
http://www.fbi.gov/pittsburgh/press-releases/2013/pittsburgh-man-sentenced-for-role-in-law-firm-hack. 
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watchdogs are constant reminders that no company or web-user should feel 
completely safe from cyberattacks. 
B. Actors 
The actors behind each of these far-reaching cyber assaults are equally varied 
in purpose, demographics, and organization.30 Initially, cyber-criminals were the 
computer whiz kids—the individuals with esoteric technical knowledge of 
computer languages and programing.31 But as computers proliferated, so did those 
who tried to misuse them. There now exists a group of individuals known as 
“enablers” who are “persons who use their technical expertise to create and then 
sell data to non-technically savvy people to engage in cyber-crime.”32 Cybercrime 
has essentially become a business enterprise.33 Although profit remains a 
significant incentive for cybercrime, it is not the sole motivation.34 Businesses, and 
defense contractors as it seems lately, must worry about ex-employees using inside 
knowledge to strike back at their former employer.35 Other cybercriminals are 
motivated by a self-proclaimed altruism and dub themselves “hacktivists.”36 The 
range of actors and motivations is incredible; from lone wolves, hacking clubs, ex-
employees, to “unmentionable” government-backed cyberattacks from our trading 
partners, Russia and China.37 It is therefore hard to conceive of a plan where 
everything is protected from everyone. 
                                                          
30 Yang & Hoffstadt, supra note 24, at 205. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Debbi Wilgoren, Edward Snowden fired by Booz Allen after admitting leak, THE WASHINGTON 
POST, June 11, 2013, 12:00 AM, http:// articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-11/world/39886122_1_ 
systems-administrator-hotel-room-u-s-officials. 
35 Id. 
36 Brian B. Kelly, Investing in A Centralized Cybersecurity Infrastructure: Why “Hacktivism” 
Can and Should Influence Cybersecurity Reform, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1663, 1676 (2012). 
37 David E. Sanger, Davide Barboza et al., Chinese Army Unit Is Seen as Tied to Hacking Against 
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2013, 12:00 AM, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/technology/chinas-
army-is-seen-as-tied-to-hacking-against-us.html?pagewanted=all; see also Jim Finkle, Russia hacked 
hundreds of Western, Asian companies: security firm, REUTERS (Jan. 22, 2014, 12:00), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/22/us-russia-cyberespionage-idUSBREA0L07Q20140122; 
Fernando M. Pinguelo & Bradford W. Muller, Virtual Crimes, Real Damages: A Primer on 
Cybercrimes in the United States and Efforts to Combat Cybercriminals, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 116 
(2011). 
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C. Methods 
The myriad of methods that cybercriminals use, are so varied, that academics 
and politicians have spent considerable time simply trying to identify an 
appropriate definition for cybercrime.38 The most general definition includes any 
crime “that is facilitated or committed using a computer, network, or hardware 
device.”39 But changes in technology and hacking methods means that any 
definition is a moving target and as new techniques emerge, lawmakers must 
struggle to amend statutes.40 State and Federal governments have played catch-up, 
filling in the gaps of existing laws as cybercrimes evolve from Trojan horses, to 
password phishing, to increasingly sophisticated or opportunistic tactics.41 For a 
national cyber-policy to be effective, it will need to take into account this amazing 
brevity of the status quo. 
II. THE CURRENT EXECUTIVE ORDER PLAN TO FORTIFY CRITICAL 
BUSINESSES 
Congress has been trying to tackle this wild, twisting cyber security problem 
for some time.42 In the last 15 years, dozens of bills have been introduced.43 Some 
proposed legislation, notably CISPA and SOPA, has even been criticized as a 
draconian threat to civil rights.44 One of the main concerns with these recent cyber 
security bills has been their potential allowance of a government invasion of 
privacy rights due to the government’s ability, under the proposed legislation, to 
request limitless data from ISPs that would not be anonymized.45 These bills also 
                                                          
38 Pinguelo & Muller, supra note 37. 
39 Id. 
40 Mary M. Calkins, They Shoot Trojan Horses, Don’t They? An Economic Analysis of Anti-
Hacking Regulatory Models, 89 GEO. L.J. 171, 179 (2000). 
41 John D. Saba, The Texas Legislature Goes Phishing, 68 TEX. B.J. 706, 708 (2005); Jasmine E. 
McNealy, Angling for Phishers: Legislative Responses to Deceptive E-Mail, 13 COMM. L. & POLICY 
275, 281 (2008). 
42 See Cyber Security Information Act, H.R. 2435, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001); see also Cyber 
Security Enhancement Act of 2002, H.R. 3482, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002); see also Cyber Security 
Information Act of 2000, H.R. 4246, 106th Cong. (2d Sess. 1999). 
43 Id. 
44 Jason Koebler, ACLU: CISPA Is Dead (For Now), US NEWS (Apr. 25, 2013, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/04/25/aclu-cispa-is-dead-for-now. 
45 Jeff Nesbit, CISPA Rolls Along, US NEWS (May 6, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/ 
news/blogs/at-the-edge/2013/05/06/cispa-rolls-along. 
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contained provisions that went beyond cybersecurity.46 For example, some of the 
bills’ provisions allowed ex parte requests from copyright owners to block access 
to websites, ostensibly to protect against alleged infringement.47 To say that 
American businesses were concerned is an understatement—major online entities 
like Wikipedia and Reddit “blacked-out” their websites in a massive coordinated 
protest.48 As a result of these concerns, Congress lost support for their cyber 
protection plan and the bills ultimately died.49 
Nevertheless, the problem still needs an answer. To this end, the Executive 
branch took up the cause where Congress fell short.50 Through Executive Order, 
the Obama Administration has initiated a general framework for cybersecurity, 
which contains a more limited scope.51 In February of 2013, the White House 
released Executive Order 13636: “Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” 
which focuses only on improving the cybersecurity protection of what are deemed 
to be “critical infrastructure entities.”52 Critical Infrastructure Entities were chosen 
as a more focused demographic, because “the national and economic security of the 
United States depends on the reliable functioning of the Nation’s critical 
infrastructure in the face of [cyber] threats.”53 In doing so, the Executive Order’s 
plan does not address other admittedly vulnerable private enterprises such as Target 
and Nieman Marcus.54 While the term “critical” is expressed generally in the plan, 
the expectation is that the term includes industrial sectors such as banking, 
                                                          
46 Id. 
47 See id. 
48 Derek E. Bambauer, The New American Way of Censorship, 49 ARIZ. ATT’Y 32, 36 
(Mar. 2013). 
49 Koebler, supra note 44. 
50 78 Fed. Reg. at 11739–40; Declan McCullagh, Obama signs long-awaited cybersecurity 
executive order, CNET (Feb. 12, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57569092-
38/obama-signs-long-awaited-cybersecurity-executive-order/. 
51 78 Fed. Reg. at 11739. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Matt Picht, Report: Neiman Marcus missed 60,000 alerts about card hack, ATLANTA JOURNAL 
CONSTITUTION (Feb. 23, 2014, 1:21 AM), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/national/report-neiman-
marcus-missed-60000-alerts-about-car/ndYww/. 
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communication, power, and transportation—sectors already heavily regulated 
because of their fundamental role in the smooth operation of society.55 
Two of the primary components of the Executive framework are what the 
Executive Order describes as “Cybersecurity Information Sharing” and “Baseline 
Framework to Reduce Cyber Risk to Critical Infrastructure.”56 
A. The Information Sharing Provision 
“Cybersecurity Information Sharing,” the first of the two components, is a 
strategy to increase the volume, timeliness, and quality of cyber threat information 
shared with U.S. private sector entities so that these entities may better protect and 
defend themselves against cyber threats.57 To achieve this goal, the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) has expanded existing programs for voluntary 
corporate-to-government and government-to-corporate information sharing.58 
Previously pilot programs or programs run by another government agency, the 
information sharing pools have been significantly boosted by the Executive 
Order.59 What these programs aim to achieve is an effective information-sharing 
framework among the government, which includes Information Sharing and 
Analysis Centers, ISPs, and their respective critical infrastructure members and 
customers.60 Currently, the system employs a series of “bulletins,” which provide 
an initial threat alert, followed by subsequent analysis on the content of the actors, 
their strategy and seriousness, and general threat climate overviews.61 
                                                          
55 Michelle Richardson, President Obama Shows No CISPA-like Invasion of Privacy Needed to 
Defend Critical Infrastructure, ACLU (Feb. 13, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-
security-technology-and-liberty/president-obama-shows-no-cispa-invasion-privacy-needed. 
56 78 Fed. Reg. at 11739–41. 
57 Id. at 11739–40. 
58 Notably, the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services (ECS) program, the Cyber Information Sharing 
and Collaboration Program (CISCP) (formerly run by the Department of Defense), and the National 
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC); see Dep’t of Homeland Sec., CIKR 
Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration Program (CISCP) (June 2013), http://csrc.nist.gov/ 
groups/SMA/ispab/documents/minutes/2013-06/ispab_june2013_menna_ciscp_one_pager.pdf. 
59 Written testimony of NPPD Office of Cybersecurity & Communications Acting Assistant 
Secretary Roberta Stempfley, and National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center 
Director Larry Zelvin for a House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, 
Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies hearing titled Facilitating Cyber Threat Information 
Sharing and Partnering with the Private Sector to Protect Critical Infrastructure: An Assessment of 
DHS Capabilities (May 16, 2013, 12:00 AM), available at https://www.dhs.gov/news/2013/05/16/ 
written-testimony-nppd-house-homeland-security-subcommittee-cybersecurity-hearing [hereinafter WT-
NPPD]. 
60 Id. 
61 Dep’t of Homeland Sec., supra note 58. 
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In the best case scenario, this information sharing program would witness 
government-corporate harmony through enough private “critical” companies 
voluntarily sharing information with the government to create a large pool of threat 
information.62 Consequently, threats that target our nation’s most vital private 
infrastructure would be thwarted by a rapid and actionable alert provided by the 
DHS.63 
Advocates for the “Cybersecurity Information Sharing” program point to a 
number of improvements over previously proposed legislation.64 For example, it 
avoids serious privacy concerns by being “privacy-neutral”—the data shared by 
“critical” corporations is still covered by state privacy laws.65 The plan’s focus on 
only “critical” corporations shows a prioritization that is likely to be more palatable 
as it will interfere less with online commerce.66 Perhaps most importantly, the 
information-sharing program is voluntary.67 CEOs can watch from the sidelines if 
they fear sharing information with the government.68 
There is also some benefit to the fact that this new initiative isn’t so new after 
all. Instead, the plan builds off existing departments and agencies, which have been 
running information sharing pilot programs for some time.69 The main DHS-
programs were sharing information well before the Executive Order expanded their 
task.70 Companies can therefore have more confidence in participating with 
programs that have a track record (i.e. the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services 
(“ECS”) program (established 2012), the Cyber Information Sharing and 
Collaboration Program (“CISCP”) (2011), and the National Cybersecurity and 
Communications Integration Center (“NCCIC”) (2009).71 The DHS has pointed to 
the success of its 45-partipant, two-way CISCP program, which shared almost 
                                                          
62 See id. 
63 Id. 
64 Richardson, supra note 55. 
65 Id. 
66 Andy Greenberg, President Obama’s Cybersecurity Executive Order Scores Much Better Than 
CISPA On Privacy, FORBES (Feb. 12, 2013, 10:37 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/ 
2013/02/12/president-obamas-cybersecurity-executive-order-scores-much-better-than-cispa-on-privacy/. 
67 78 Fed. Reg. at 11739; see also Enhanced Cybersecurity Services, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
http://www.dhs.gov/enhanced-cybersecurity-services (last visited Mar. 7, 2014). 
68 Greenberg, supra note 66. 
69 See WT-NPPD, supra note 59. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
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20,000 indicators in the first year or so.72 The DHS reports that of the information 
shared within the CISCP program, roughly 60 percent was provided to the 
government by the private sector.73 
Thus, the two-way information sharing policy outlined by Executive Order 
has the potential at least to provide a large pool of useable threat information, 
which hopefully will prevent some of the cyberattacks hindering our national 
security. 
B. The Best Practices Provision 
The second major component of the Executive Order is the “Baseline 
Framework to Reduce Cyber Risk to Critical Infrastructure.”74 This component 
aims to create a roadmap of best practices “that align policy, business, and 
technological approaches to address cyber risks.”75 The philosophy tries to account 
for an ever-changing threat and economic viability.76 The guidelines seek to be 
“technology neutral and enable critical infrastructure sectors to benefit from a 
competitive market.”77 
As required by the Executive Order, the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (“NIST”) released a “best practices” guideline based on this policy in 
February 2014 (the “Framework”).78 The Framework provides a blueprint for 
identifying potential threats, protecting against cyberattacks and, if an attack 
occurs, recovering from it.79 The standards outlined are flexible, and generally 
contain no specific methodologies or mandatory procedures for private companies 
to take.80 Instead, the Framework uses a system of “Tiers” of preparedness, which 
                                                          
72 Miller, supra note 18. 
73 Id. 
74 78 Fed. Reg. at 11739. 
75 Id. at 11740–41. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS 
AND TECH. (NIST) (Feb. 12, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/ 
cybersecurity-framework-021214-final.pdf [hereinafter NIST]. 
79 Kathleen Hennessey & Chris O’Brien, Cybersecurity guidelines for companies are unveiled by 
White House, LA TIMES, Feb. 12, 2014, 12:00 AM, http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/12/business/la-
fi-cyber-security-20140213. 
80 Antone Gonsalves, NIST Cyber Security Framework proposal provides no ‘measurable 
cybersecurity assurance,’ CSO ONLINE (Sept. 5, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.csoonline.com/article/ 
739139/nist-cyber-security-framework-proposal-provides-no-measurable-cybersecurity-assurance-. 
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are flexible enough to allow a company in any specific critical industry to adapt to 
its unique security situation.81 This avoids a one-size-fits-all approach. Since the 
preparedness “targets” are couched in generalities, the idea is they will not force 
companies to adopt any technology or practices that the company finds inefficient 
or too costly.82 As one commentator noted, “the cybersecurity framework doesn’t 
tell companies what to do or what tools to buy . . . but it does standardize the 
questions all CEOs should ask about their companies’ security practices. . . . and it 
shows them what the answers ought to look like.”83 
Since the Framework’s standards are voluntary goals, “critical” infrastructure 
is spared the draconian imposition of previous legislation. The voluntary nature of 
the program shows “how sharply proponents of strong regulation have scaled back 
their ambitions—and even their language—in the face of industry opposition to 
government intervention.”84 The Framework lets organizations choose the level of 
cybersecurity they want to achieve; nothing in the guidelines is mandatory.85 It is 
unlikely, therefore, to cause immediate financial or logistical burden on the profit-
minded company. 
Like the information sharing programs, the actual standards and 
methodologies are for the most part, the status quo. Companies will not be 
surprised by what amounts to little more than a compilation of established industry 
security practices.86 Thus, the Framework has the possibility of raising the 
industry-as-a-whole, by outlining a path for cybersecurity improvement that does 
not place any undue burden on the “critical” infrastructure companies that seek to 
utilize it. 
III. THE FAULTS OF THE CURRENT APPROACH 
Despite any potential this Executive Plan has if executed perfectly, it is likely 
to do very little to protect this nation’s critical infrastructure against cyberattacks. 
                                                          
81 Hennessey, supra note 79. 
82 Cynthia Brumfield, NIST framework released to widespread praise, but what happens next?, 
CSO ONLINE (Feb. 13, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.csoonline.com/article/748216/nist-framework-
released-to-widespread-praise-but-what-happens-next-. 
83 Wyatt Kash, Why Businesses Can’t Ignore US Cybersecurity Framework, INFORMATIONWEEK 
(Feb. 14, 2014, 9:25 AM), http://www.informationweek.com/government/cybersecurity/why-
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85 Gonsalves, supra note 80. 
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Even at its best, it fails to confront the business realities and certain unique 
characteristics of cyber threats, which are necessary to create an effective 
government-led cyber policy. 
A. Problems With Information Sharing Program 
An information-sharing scheme will likely see resistance no matter how much 
privacy protection is provided. Despite privacy and civil rights concerns, however, 
information sharing has remained a key concept in the new executive order-based 
cybersecurity plan.87 Still, even if the policy achieves its goal of being “privacy-
neutral” and avoids the controversial elements that killed CISPA and SOPA, 
information sharing in general is likely to create a considerable deal of hesitation 
and concern.88 “The big consequence of Edward Snowden’s NSA leaks will be that 
countries and companies will erect borders of sorts in cyberspace” and thus be 
extremely wary of anything that has the words “government” and “information 
sharing” so close together.89 Companies like Microsoft and Google are openly 
trying to thwart the Government’s possible acquisition of their data and similar 
resistance is likely to be found among privacy-minded “critical” companies.90 
Experts have asked if information sharing programs can actually work.91 Even 
the Government itself is aware that this is a murky area. Anne Neuberger, director 
of the NSA’s Commercial Solutions Center, has said of information sharing 
programs: “on the one hand, they’re cited as critical . . . on the other hand, they’re 
frequently criticized as ineffective.”92 With the constantly morphing nature of 
cyber-threats, it is difficult to determine how effective advance information 
regarding the attacks would be or the extent to which countermeasures could be 
effectively deployed based on advance information. Most available information 
regarding threats thwarted by existing programs is unclear.93 The 20,000 indicators 
shared by the DHS last year do not reveal how effective that information was.94 
                                                          
87 78 Fed. Reg. at 11739; McCullagh, supra note 50. 
88 Richardson, supra note 55. 
89 L.S. Davos, The Snowden effect, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 24, 2014, 2:06 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2014/01/internet-governance. 
90 Id. 
91 Michael O’Connell, Threat information sharing builds better cyber standards, expert says, 
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How necessary or valuable was any of it? One may assume that such a quantity of 
information necessarily put a burden on the 45 companies based on sheer volume, 
but an accurate account of that burden does not appear to be available. 
It seems true that information-sharing programs can be effective when 
targeted to highly specific information shared among a small group of related 
companies.95 But the success of such programs, like the “Financial Services—
Information Sharing and Analysis Center,” is due to the very limited and 
interconnected nature of that industry.96 At best, it is unclear whether such a model 
can be expanded to the varied sectors deemed “critical.” 
The Executive Order’s information sharing program also fails to fix issues 
that have stymied such programs before.97 In part because the government doesn’t 
provide any funding, businesses have decided not to invest in new secure facilities 
and network upgrades to handle classified data.98 Additionally, because the 
government seeks to share classified information, there will be added costs.99 Not 
all companies have employees with the necessary clearance levels. This is noted in 
the Executive Order itself.100 Yet the proposed solution of expedited clearance will 
still add costs that may dissuade corporate participation.101 A cheaper alternative 
would still present problems. An independent research group suggests the 
government share classified threat information with “key decision makers” when a 
corporation otherwise lacks certified employees.102 While this would improve the 
odds a threat warning is acted upon, it is likely to increase fears about leaked 
information.103 
                                                          
95 O’Connell, supra note 91. 
96 Id. 
97 See Miller, supra note 18. 
98 Miller, supra note 18. 
99 Jacob B. Pankowski & Debra McGuire Mercer, Executive Order on cybersecurity impacts 
Government contractors and other critical infrastructure entities, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 4 2013, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8431e873-8d30-43fb-8aca-5f87ab068a5c. 
100 78 Fed. Reg. at 11740. 
101 Pankowski, supra note 99. 
102 Bipartisan Policy Center, Cyber Security Task Force: Public-Private Information Sharing, 13 
(2012), available at http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/PublicPrivate%20Information% 
20Sharing.pdf. 
103 See David Ingram, Stephen Kim Pleading Guilty For Leaking Classified Information, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 7, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/07/stephen-kim-
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As a result of these unaddressed costs and mistrust, existing information 
sharing programs have witnessed feeble participation rates. For example, critics 
have cited very few have made the investment and joined the voluntary Enhanced 
Cybersecurity Services program.104 In fact, “none of the 54 companies that showed 
initial interest since the executive order came out have moved into the program.”105 
Sharing programs could increase participation by sharing only unclassified 
information, but obviously the value of such information would be proportionately 
degraded.106 Consequently, the Cyber Information Sharing and Collection Program 
(“CISCP”), which shares two-ways among 45 companies, has a higher participation 
rate, albeit only slightly.107 
Beyond its failure to address the problems of existing programs, the Executive 
Order’s plan creates confusion as to what companies are now required to do.108 
There is serious concern that the voluntary program may soon become 
mandatory.109 This could happen in two ways. First, this program could become 
mandatory as agencies promulgate regulations.110 According to the Executive 
Order, the federal agencies “shall propose prioritized, risk-based, efficient, and 
coordinated actions . . . to mitigate cyber risk.”111 One of the “actions” agencies 
could propose would be enforcement of the program using existing regulations, 
expanded interpretations of existing regulations, and adoption of new 
regulations.112 Critics argue this directive “can only be read to open the door for 
federal agencies to enforce the Program.”113 
The voluntary information sharing programs also risk becoming mandatory 
through civil liability pressure.114 “A company that receives cyber threat reports 
from the government will ignore those reports at their peril since regulatory 
agencies and private litigants could claim that the company was negligent . . . for 
                                                          
104 Miller, supra note 18. 
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ignoring the reports.”115 There will also be pressure to share information. A 
company in an information-sharing regime that fails to share appropriate cyber 
threat information is therefore in danger of litigation or regulatory action for failing 
to participate.116 Private companies could therefore be pressured into sharing 
sensitive data to the government and other private companies participating in the 
ostensibly voluntary program. 
An information-sharing scheme as proposed by the Executive Order is 
therefore unlikely to be as effective as planned. Its efficiency is limited by 
participation issues and cost concerns, as indicated by the inefficiency of current 
sharing programs. 
B. Problems With Best Practices Policy 
The Best Practices Policy of the Executive Order will also not be an effective 
improvement to the cybersecurity of “critical” infrastructure. The Framework’s 
flexibility, voluntariness, and lack of both enforcement and incentive provisions are 
likely to create confusion and perhaps even stifle innovation. In an effort to create a 
program palatable to private enterprise, the net effect of conciliation will be very 
little progress. 
The first problem with the NIST Framework is its creation of confusion 
regarding the duties of private enterprise.117 Corporations will be left wondering if 
they have fulfilled their obligations.118 “Most senior executives are likely to ask, 
‘have we adopted or are we in compliance with the Framework?’”119 They will 
likely be told, “it’s impossible to answer these questions clearly and that the goal is 
to simply ‘use’ the Framework.”120 
How will that framework then be “used?” Again, there is confusion. Critics 
have cited the outcome of a risk assessment can be stretched in any direction.121 
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117 Joab Jackson, How the NIST cybersecurity framework can help secure the enterprise, 
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Executives are therefore able to ascribe to themselves a job well done. Allowing 
organizations to choose the level of cybersecurity they want to achieve means “an 
organization could choose a level of zero, and still be conformant with the 
guidelines.”122 The Framework allows any organization, no matter how effective 
they are regarding cybersecurity, to be guideline-conformant.123 Instead of 
motivating corporations to spend large sums of money to improve their cyber 
protection, the Framework allows complacency and may even have a negative 
effect.124 Therefore, in an effort to make everyone happy, “the guidelines have also 
made the hackers happy.”125 
There is also a significant fear that this Framework will become mandatory 
through the methods that apply to the information-sharing scheme.126 “The 
guidelines are likely to become the de facto standard for litigators and 
regulators.”127 Commentators warn any company that manages critical 
infrastructure in the U.S. and disregards the Framework “does so at its own 
peril.”128 Critical infrastructure owners need to recognize, “if a company’s 
cybersecurity practices are ever questioned during a regulatory investigation and 
litigation, the baseline for what’s considered commercially reasonable is likely to 
become the NIST Cybersecurity Framework.”129 Courts have imposed liability on 
companies for failing to abide by industry standards, and because this publication 
carries so much weight, it is likely to set that standard.130 
As executives struggle to address the possibility of civil liability, confusion 
will abound as to what level of adherence reduces that liability. Ostensibly the 
Framework binds companies to nothing.131 Yet despite this technical lack of 
obligation, critics have also remarked that the Framework will create implicit 
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liability for “critical” corporations that fail to adopt the highest standard outlined.132 
“Critical infrastructure companies defending their cybersecurity practices in 
litigation or regulatory investigations should be prepared to show that the practices 
adhere to Tier 4, considered ‘adaptive.’”133 The “adaptive” level iHs obtained when 
a company is “regularly evaluating the threats it faces, testing its procedures, and 
modifying these procedures where appropriate to address new threats.”134 Tier 4 
“adaptive” is the highest Tier, requiring the most diligence and the most financial 
and personnel resource to achieve.135 Consequently, even though the Framework is 
promoted as a voluntary program of mere recommendations, it is actually likely to 
punish those companies that fall short of the most demanding mark. 
A third problem with the guidelines is there is virtually nothing new in the 
framework.136 As noted above, a lack of surprises is welcome news for “critical” 
infrastructure operators. However, this also makes the framework rather 
unnecessary. Many organizations essentially “adopted” the Framework elements 
long before the Framework itself was constructed.137 Studies suggest 40-50% of 
private entities can be classified into this “best practices” group.138 The Framework 
is therefore trying to achieve what the market can do on its own. 
In this respect, the Framework may stall advancement and innovation. It may 
serve to fix the bar, but fix it low. “Policy makers need to understand that using the 
framework is not the same thing as assuring critical infrastructure security—much 
more is needed.139 Such a misunderstanding could lead to misguided public 
policies.”140 Subjecting industry and technology corporations to Framework-based 
regulation may stifle innovation and ultimately result in increased costs to the 
federal government.141 A scramble to protect from civil liability will promote 
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complacency and box ticking.142 Given the nature of cyber threats today, this 
should be especially worrisome since “the bad guys are impressive innovators.”143 
The Framework has also been criticized for lacking focus on certain serious 
cyber threats.144 For instance, there is no mention of cloud-based cyber threats.145 
Other threats aren’t addressed by the very nature of the Framework’s assessment 
system.146 The traditional risk assessment structure of the Framework “doesn’t 
address malicious intent . . . it’s that simple.”147 
Other criticism of the Framework focuses on financials. “Although the 
President’s Order requires the framework to be cost effective, there is almost no 
analysis of this critical issue in the framework documents. If the goal is to have 
industry adopt the framework on a voluntary basis, its cost effectiveness is an 
essential element.”148 
The Administration’s plan of furthering cybersecurity through voluntary best 
practices is accordingly unlikely to achieve the desired results. Instead, it will 
create more confusion than innovation and subject “critical” companies to the 
threat of civil liability. 
IV. AN ALTERNATE APPROACH SHOULD BE FOLLOWED 
Rather than pursuing a program of information sharing and voluntary 
guidelines, the Administration should focus on financing improvements and 
creating a clear liability scheme, which forces the desired progress. This is the most 
efficient avenue toward better protecting our national security and would also take 
into consideration the business concerns of the target private enterprise. 
“Most security officers already have a solid understanding of how their 
systems need to be secured . . . what they too often lack are the adequate 
                                                          
142 Anthony M. Freed, Cyber Security Framework Lacks Mitigating Controls and Cloud Security, 
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resources.”149 Under the current Framework, companies are left to wonder how 
they will finance any voluntary cyber improvements without incentives.150 
Corporations failing to invest in cybersecurity often cite budget constraints as “the 
number one challenge to contributing to the [cybersecurity] levels the business 
expects.”151 Although the President’s Order requires the framework to be cost 
effective, there is almost no analysis of this critical issue in the framework 
documents.152 Therefore, if the goal is for industries to adopt the framework on a 
voluntary basis, its cost effectiveness is an essential element.153 
Financing security improvements could be accomplished in two ways: 
(1) directly covering the costs of the necessary improvements or (2) creating 
financial incentives. The DHS is already directly funding airlines’ security 
improvements and a similar approach could work for “critical” infrastructure.154 
It seems, however, that incentives will likely be the preferred path in this 
situation, given its mention in the Executive Order.155 But, any incentive has yet to 
be properly developed.156 In theory, incentives would encompass a wide range of 
offerings or conditions that could include technical and public policy measures.157 
Training and education or critical software could be provided.158 In such fashion, 
corporations would find it makes more financial sense to improve areas of neglect. 
Financial incentives, however, are not enough. As a senior administration 
official has remarked, “government-based incentives are really important for us to 
pursue . . . but at the end of the day, it’s the market that’s got to drive the business 
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case for the cybersecurity framework.”159 Surely the federal government is going to 
do its best to make the costs of using the Framework lower, and the benefits of the 
framework higher, “but it’s the market that’s going to ultimately make this 
work.”160 Corporate executives have noted the limitations of an incentive 
program.161 The chairman of AT&T remarked, “the best incentive on cybersecurity 
is fear,” he said, “it scares the living hell out of us.”162 
In addition to financial support, an effective cybersecurity policy requires a 
liability regime that is clear but not burdensome. Corporations should not have to 
weigh the risk of civil liability under a voluntary program with the cost of 
improvements. Instead, standards should be mandated, imposing liability on 
corporations’ failures to improve their critical infrastructure. If done correctly, this 
could also allow for executives to implement a security protocol that is adapted to 
their unique corporate circumstance. For instance, assuming the Obama 
Administration wants serious results, a target similar to Tier 4 could be outlined 
with broad language. Making this goal mandatory removes the confusion by 
imposing actual liability on failure. Companies will immediately improve their 
cybersecurity infrastructure if liability for economic loss due to a breach is 
imposed. Due to the economic loss doctrine, companies presently face little risk of 
liability for the injuries that result from their failure to prevent cyber-intrusions.163 
Removing default immunity from liability would incentivize firms to harden their 
systems against intrusion.164 
An imposed liability scheme is morally defensible. A higher standard and 
burden on private critical infrastructure entities is validated by their role in national 
security. As the President’s Order itself states, “the national and economic security 
of the United States depends on the reliable functioning of the Nation’s critical 
infrastructure in the face of such threats.”165 This varies slightly from the burden 
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placed on airlines.166 No doubt any imposed liability scheme will face resistance, 
but given the small pool of companies targeted, this objection should be overruled. 
It is a financially defensible scheme as well. Government imposed standards 
have been shown to be the most cost-effective in certain cybersecurity scenarios.167 
In a highly technical paper entitled “Who Should Be Responsible for Software 
Security,” it was found that government imposed standards can be preferable to a 
system where the private company picks up the tab for either patching the problem 
or the cost of loss after a breach.168 
Given possible resistance to an increased burden, a safe harbor provision may 
also be appropriate. For instance, firms that implement security standards 
developed in tandem with regulators, but nevertheless suffer cyber-attacks, could 
be offered immunity from lawsuits seeking redress for the resulting damages.169 If 
such a carrot-stick tandem of liability and safe harbor were employed, companies 
would be encouraged to pursue the highest Tier of best practices without an undue 
burden for the inevitable intrusion. This would allow the individual businesses to 
choose the details of their particular security strategy, while still achieving broad 
industry-wide progress.170 
CONCLUSION 
The President’s policy is a start in the right direction. It should be lauded for 
picking up a difficult subject after repeated Congressional failure. There is no 
doubt that a cyber weapon that can shut down nuclear reactors should become a 
priority in our overall national security strategy.171 How to structure that 
government framework for cybersecurity will remain a subject of debate, but the 
President is correct for showing tremendous concern for industry input in the 
                                                          
166 Alex Davies, The Budget Deal Will Make Air Travel More Expensive, BUSINESS INSIDER 
(Dec. 11, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/budget-deal-higher-air-fares-2013-
12#ixzz2uBgSLW1. 
167 Terrence August & Tunay I. Tunca, Who Should Be Responsible for Software Security?: A 
Comparative Analysis of Liability Policies in Network Environments, 57(5) MGMT. SCI. 934 (May 
2011), available at http://rady.ucsd.edu/faculty/directory/august/pub/docs/who-should-be-
responsible.pdf. 
168 Id. at 934. 
169 Gus P. Coldebella & Brian M. White, Foundational Questions Regarding the Federal Role in 
Cybersecurity, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 233, 235 (2010); Sales, supra note 156, at 1557–58. 
170 Eggerton, supra note 143. 
171 Charles Arthur, Symantec discovers 2005 US computer virus attack on Iran nuclear plants, 
THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 26, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/feb/26/ 
symantec-us-computer-virus-iran-nuclear. 
  
 
 
J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XIV – Spring 2014 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2014.146 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
314 
process.172 In light of Snowden’s leaks and the SOPA and CISPA “blackouts,” the 
battle is certainly going to be uphill. But letting corporations write the strategy is 
not going to produce results. The NIST Framework and the overall voluntary 
structure of the Presidential strategy acquiesce too much to public pressure. 
If we are trying to protect something as vital as our national security, there is 
less room for compromise. We can achieve an increase in cybersecurity standards 
among private enterprise by imposing a liability regime that shows corporate 
executives that there will be real consequences for failing to properly protect their 
infrastructure. Proper incentives will then assuage some of the regulatory stress 
produced by such a plan. Putting money on the table is only part of the issue. We 
need to persuade private enterprise to use that incentive by providing 
consequences. Safe harbor will make the system more business-friendly. 
It is important to remember that this Presidential policy is still only oriented 
toward “critical” infrastructure companies. That definition is flexible, but 
limited.173 The benefit of a clear liability scheme that removes the currently 
enjoyed economic loss immunity is that it can be scaled up. When the time comes 
to shore up the security of Target or the air-condition repairman in Pennsylvania, 
this scheme can be easily applied across industry and operation scale.174 With the 
threat of real financial liability, both critical industry and private retailers will have 
an appropriate incentive to better protect our national security and maybe produce a 
few less headlines. 
                                                          
172 NIST Issues Preliminary Cybersecurity Framework, INFOSECURITY MAGAZINE (Oct. 23, 2013, 
12:00 AM), http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/view/35233/nist-issues-preliminary-cybersecurity-
framework/. 
173 NIST, supra note 78, at 3. 
174 See Sales, supra note 5, at 1557. 
